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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Attorney and Client-Attorney's Liability to Third
Parties On Contracts Made in Behalf of Client
Within the realm of agency it is recognized that where an agent
for a disclosed principal deals with a third party, in a manner which
would usually accompany or would be incidental or necessary to
the accomplishment of the main authorized purpose of the agency,
the principal becomes directly liable to the third party for the agent's
acts." But the application of this seemingly inviolate principle has
been questioned in a few cases involving the liability of an attorney
for contracts entered into on behalf of his client. This is somewhat
surprising in light of the fact that the courts have been almost unan-
imous in holding that the nature of the attorney-client relationship
recognizes the attorney's authority to bind his client and his duty
to protect and promote his client's interest. They extend the scope
of this implied authority and duty beyond the mere prosecution of
the suit to all things necessary and incidental to this end.2 Of course,
there are limits beyond which this relationship will not extend but
it has been the predominant practice for the courts to hold that
"where the relationship of attorney and client exists, the law of
principal and agent is generally applied, and the client is bound,
according to the ordinary rule of agency, by the acts of the attorney
within the scope of his authority."'3 The courts in recognizing the
attorney-client relationship as basically controlled by the law of
agency4 have well defined standards by which to measure the actions
of an attorney in the management of his client's cause.
'See Runkle v. Burnham, 153 U.S. 216 (1894); Edgewood Knoll Apart-
ments, Inc. v. Braswell, 239 N.C. 560, 80 S.E.2d 653 (1954); Stephens v.
John L. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 107, 75 S.E. 933 (1912); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 161 (1958). It is recognized that an agent even
though acting within his actual or apparent authority may substitute his
liability for that of his principal if he expressly assumes liability, as was
the case in Betz v. Bank of Miami Beach, 95 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1957), or
fails to disclose his principal, as illustrated in Senor v. Bangor Mills, 211
F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1954).2 Bank of Glade Spring v. McEwen, 160 N.C. 414, 76 S.E. 222 (1912).
'Id. at 421, 76 S.E. at 225; accord, Jacobsen v. Overseas Tankship Corp.,
11 F.R.D. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Middleton v. Stavely, 124 Colo. 28, 235
P.2d 596 (1951); State v. Barley, 240 N.C. 253, 81 S.E.2d 772 (1954).
' Generally, a stricter standard of care is imposed upon the attorney
LIABILITY OF ATTORNEY
In a recent Massachusetts case the plaintiffs, a partnership of
court reporters, were engaged by the defendant, an attorney-at-law,
to take shorthand notes of a hearing in which defendant's client
was a litigant. There was no explicit agreement between the parties
as to whom plaintiffs would look for the costs of their services.
Three bills were submitted by plaintiffs to defendant. The first
two during the course of the hearing, for work done to date, and
the third, at its conclusion, for the final installment. The earlier
bills, having been sent to defendant, were at defendant's request
redirected to his client and were paid by check drawn on the client
under cover-letter of the defendant. It is the last bill for the final
installment that represents the principal sum on which plaintiffs
sued both the attorney and his client. This suit resulted in a finding
for the plaintiffs solely against the attorney and this result was
affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
Burt v. Gahan.5
There is not a wealth of modem case law involving this situa-
tion in relation to attorney-client and third party dealings,6 but a
few recent cases are available7 and from them it becomes apparent
that the current treatment by the courts of situations similar to Burt
than is normally applied to the general agent. This standard of care is
recognized in Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 8 S.E.2d 144 (1954).
- Mass. -, 220 N.E.2d 817 (1966).
The import of this case on the practicing attorney is significant and
should not be confined to the narrow fact situation presented in this case,
that of an attorney contracting for stenographic services, but should be
applied to all situations in which an attorney finds it beneficial or necessary
to his client's cause to obtain the services of a third person. A few of the
more common examples being the fees or costs of printers, stenographers,
appraisers, accountants, investigators, witnesses, arbitrators, officers, etc.
'In one such case, the court held that where a stenographer knew the
attorney was acting in behalf of a client the attorney was not liable even
though the attorney did not specifically describe himself as an attorney.
Zengerle v. Weiss, 48 Misc. 2d 271, 264 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1965); accord,
Rayvid v. Burgh, 37 Misc. 2d 963, 234 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1962); Sanders v.
Riddick, 127 Tenn. 701, 156 S.W. 464 (1913). Another court found the
attorney not liable for the printing of briefs and abstracts where the at-
torney's representative capacity was disclosed to the printer on the printed
material, even though the attorney was personally billed. Petrando v.
Barry, 4 Ill. App. 2d 319, 124 N.E.2d 85 (1955); accord, Loder Appeal
Press, Inc. v. Peerless Sugar Co., 277 App. Div. 737, 102 N.Y.S.2d 820
(1951). Where an attorney appointed an appraiser for an estate without
arrangements being made regarding payment of fees to the appraiser, the
court held the attorney not liable because he was an agent for a known
principal. Epstein v. Sichel, 107 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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has been to apply the standards established by the law of agency.'
It is equally apparent that the court in Burt chose to depart from
this standard in its treatment of the principal case. In doing so the
Massachusetts court recognized that where an attorney contracts
in behalf of his client with a third party, the law of agency is gen-
erally applicable, but then rejected this as the controlling principle
in the following passage:
While in a broad sense counsel may be an agent and his client
a principal, there is much more involved than mere agency. The
relationship of attorney and client is paramount, and is subject
to established professional standards. In short, the attorney,
and not his client, is in charge of litigation, and is so recognized
by the court.9
The Burt case supported this departure from the normally applicable
rule of agency by their reliance on Judd & Detweiler, Inc. v. Gitt-
ings'° which summarized its holding by stating that "in the absence
of express notice to the contrary, court officials and persons con-
nected... may safely regard themselves as dealing with the attorney,
instead of with his client."11
The import of the opinion in the Burt case, and its supporting
authority, seems to be that the attorney has such absolute and com-
plete control over the client's cause that the status of the attorney
is actually elevated to the level of a principal and his client is either
placed on a parity or subordinated to a lesser role. This concept
is subject to attack in that it fails to recognize that the attorney
is bound by a more rigid standard of care than is the ordinary
agent'2 and that this more stringent duty coupled with the narrow
single-purposeness of the scope of his authority actually limits the
attorney's authority' 3 to enter into contracts as compared to the
broad authority usually conferred upon the average business agent.
The Burt case's reliance on Judd also seems to be somewhat
' The scope of this comment does not include the legal treatment of the
taxible costs of litigation.
*- Mass. at -, 220 N.E.2d at 818.
1043 App. D.C. 304 (1915). The principal case cited the following
cases as to similar effect: Monick v. Melnicoff, 144 A.2d 381 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1958) ; Trimmier v. Thomson, 41 S.C. 125, 19 S.E. 291 (1894) ; Heath
v. Bates, 49 Conn. 342, 44 Am. Rep. 234 (1881); Cocks v. Searl, 21 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 62 (K.B. 1905).1143 App. D.C. at 310-11.
12 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 2-3 supra and accompanying text.
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misplaced in that the Judd court was faced with a situation not pre-
sented to the court in the principal case. The Judd case showed
the presence of local custom and also a course of dealing extending
over a long period of time between an officer of the law and the
attorney which the court expressly recognized as a controlling factor
in that case. The court in Judd found that where a course of con-
duct is present the "law may imply a promise on the part of a
lawyer to pay fees for the services of client's writs; as where the
officer had been in the constant practice of charging his fees for
such services to the lawyer, who from time to time had settled such
charges without questioning their legality."' 4
It should also be noted that the decision in the Burt case relied
on the early Massachusetts case of Tarbell v. Dickinson' 5 where an
attorney was held liable to a sheriff for his fees in serving a writ at
the attorney's request. Thus, both the decisions relied upon by the
Massachusetts court were cases involving a public officer rather
than a private contracting individual. The propriety of applying
such cases to a fact situation involving a private business man in
his dealings with an attorney should not be left unquestioned. The
nature of a public ministerial officer is in itself uniquely different
from that of a private contractor. The most important difference
is that the public ministerial officer has a duty to perform the services
requested and the duty is one which has been imposed by law with
the general manner of its performance specifically designated. There
is usually little or no discretion or bargaining power allowed the
officer.' Consequently, the courts have generally recognized that
the legally imposed duties and responsibilities upon public min-
isterial officers have demanded protection for the officer in order to
encourage him to perform his duties without fear of personal loss.'
This trend to protect the public ministerial officer in his obligatory
contracts makes these cases' S less persuasive in their application to
similar situations where the parties to the contract are private
" 43 App. D.C. at 309.
" 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 345 (1849).
" See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 475 (1866); MECHEM,
THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS §§ 657-8 (2d ed. 1890).
"See Erskine v. Hohnbach, 81 U.S. (14 Wall) 613 (1871); State v
Lutz, 65 N.C. 503 (1871); Gore v. Mastin, 66 N.C. 371 (1871).
"See Murphy v. Shinberg, 304 Mass. 1, 22 N.E.2d 597 (1939); Mc-
Closkey v. Bril, 286 App. Div. 143, 142 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1955); Annot., 100
A.L.R. 533 (1936).
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individuals who are completely free to contract on any terms and
conditions that they desire.
The North Carolina court has held that where the attorney-
client relationship exists the law of agency applies."0 It also rec-
ognized that the scope of the attorney's authority to act for and
bind his client extends to all things necessary and incidental to the
proper management of the client's cause.2 ° The North Carolina
court has not expressly given public ministerial officers a remedy
against attorneys acting in behalf of their clients or imposed a duty
on the attorney to expressly disclaim his liability for such fees in
this situation. Quite the contrary, the court has stated that the
fees of a sheriff "are paid or tendered by the creditor, for whose
benefit the services are to be rendered."'" Similarly, the court has
said that the right of a witness to recover his compensation is against
the party for whom he is summoned.22 These pronouncements
would seem to indicate that the North Carolina courts would apply
the law of agency to the situation presented in Burt.23
An opinion which questions the application of agency principles
to attorney-client and third party contracts in North Carolina is
found in Ethics Opinion No. 44524 of the North Carolina State
Bar Council which states:
It is perfectly proper for an attorney to agree with a physician
as to how much he shall be paid to testify in a court action, it
being understood that this agreement reached between the attor-
ney and physician is by the attorney in his representative ca-
pacity for his client and that the amount is to be paid by the
client and the client agreeing to the fee charged by the expert
witness. 25
'" See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
20 See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
"Taylor & Duncan v. Rhyne, 65 N.C. 530, 531 (1871); accord, Farm-
ers' Bank, Inc. v. Merchants' & Farmers' Bank, Inc., 204 N.C. 378, 168
S.E. 221 (1933) ; Dunn v. Clerk's Office, 176 N.C. 50, 96 S.E. 738 (1918);
Vannoy v. Haymore, 71 N.C. 128 (1874)
2 See McClure v. Fulbright, 196 N.C. 450, 146 S.E. 74 (1929); Bailey
v. Brown, 105 N.C. 127, 10 S.E. 1054 (1890); State v. Massey, 104 N.C.
877, 10 S.E. 608 (1890).
" There is nothing expressly in the opinions to indicate that the at-
torney procured these services for his client but it is unlikely that the
contracts arose otherwise.





This opinion recognizes the attorney's authority to contract as an
agent for a disclosed principal but seems to go further and require
that the attorney and the third party reach an understanding that
the client has expressly agreed to the expenses to be charged. This
interpretation supports the presumption raised in the principal case
that an agent acting for a disclosed principal within the scope of
his authority is presumed to act for himself unless he expressly dis-
claims his own liability. Another possible interpretation in con-
formity with the application of the law of agency to the attorney's
dealings with a third party is that it is proper, within the scope of
an attorney's general authority, for an attorney to hire an expert
witness in behalf of his client's cause; the result, then, is a pre-
sumption that the attorney was acting as an agent for his client,
that the client is liable on the contract as a principal, and that the
client has agreed to the terms of the contract. Whatever the proper
interpretation of Ethics Opinion No. 445 or its standing in a court
of law, it raises serious doubts as to the accuracy of any prediction
as to the possible outcome of litigation similar to the Burt case in
North Carolina.
Since the Burt case requires the attorney to expressly disclaim
personal liability and destroys the old presumption that an agent
for a disclosed principal is presumed to be dealing in behalf of his
principal when nothing is said to the contrary, the case establishes
a pitfall in the path of the unwary attorney. He may no longer
contract as an agent for a disclosed principal with the normal
resulting consequences for there is now an added presumption that
he intends to contract for himself and an added burden of expressly
disclaiming his personal liability for his normal actions in behalf
of his client. This decision may also establish an inherent conflict
between the attorney's duty to freely operate within the scope of
his authority to provide all that is necessary and incidental to the
best management of his client's cause and his personal interest in
his own economic and personal freedom from liability."' In North
Carolina, the attorney should be wary in his reliance on the agency
principle in this area for the Burt case illustrates there is room for
variance. A voluntary assumption of the burden of specifically dis-
"' Quaere: Will this conflict create any reluctance on the part of an at-
torney to represent a client of little means?
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claiming personal liability and seeking the clients express authority
in this situation may be the stitch in time that saved nine.
ALGERNON L. BUTLER, JR.
Bankruptcy-Exemptions-Life Insurance Policies With Reserved
Right to Change Beneficiary
The issue in In Matter of Wolfe1 was whether cash surrender
values of insurance policies on the life of the bankrupt were exempt
from the claims of a trustee in bankruptcy. Both policies named the
wife as beneficiary, but reserved to the bankrupt husband the ab-
solute right to change the beneficiary. In claiming that the cash
surrender values of the policies were exempt, the bankrupt relied
on both statutory' and constitutional" provisions. The court held
that the statute was a void attempt to extend the insurance exemp-
tion fixed in the constitution and that "the cash surrender values
of . .. [the] policies are not exempt property under the Constitu-
tion ... of North Carolina . .."
As of the date of the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the trustee
acquires title to all propery of the bankrupt5 except that which is
held to be exempt.' An insurance policy is property that would
1249 F. Supp. 784 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
' The relevant portion of the statutory provision reads as follows:
If a policy of insurance is effected by any person on his own life...
in favor of a person other than himself ... the lawful beneficiary
... thereof, other than the insured or the executor or administrator of
such insured .. . shall be entitled to its proceeds and avails against
creditors and representatives of the insured ...whether or not the
right to change the beneficiary is reserved or permitted ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-206 (1965).
'The relevant portion of the constitution provides as follows:
The husband may insure his own life for the sole use and benefit of
his wife ... and in case of the death of the husband the amount thus
insured shall be paid over to the wife ... for her . . . own use, free
from all the claims of the representatives of her husband, or any of
his creditors. And the policy shall not be subject to claims of creditors
of the insured during the life of the insured, if the insurance issued
is for the sole use and benefit of the wife ....
N.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 7.
'249 F. Supp. at 786.
Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879(a) (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1964).
' "This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed.., by the State laws ..... " Bankruptcy Act § 6, 52
Stat. 847 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
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